Showing posts with label INFS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label INFS. Show all posts

Feb 19, 2008

INFS -- Comments from the Conference Call

As I discussed in the previous post, INFS reporting their first operating profit was certainly better news than the alternative. However, while analysts were congratulating the CEO on “a great quarter” there were two statements made that seem extremely disconcerting to me.

First, the CEO enthusiastically pointed out that 80% of the company’s products have been refreshed over the last 2 quarters. New products are the only way a technology company can grow as they replace the old technology that’s quickly falling in price with newer, more expensive products.

So am I the only one concerned that with 80% of the product line upgraded over the last 6 months, ASPs (average selling price) are DOWN 20% year-over-year?


Q4:2007 ASP=$856 94K units shipped
Q3:2007 ASP=$882 85K units shipped
Q2:2007 ASP=$1,022 72K units shipped
Q1:2007 ASP=$853 91K units shipped
Q4:2006 ASP=$1,090 79K units shipped
Q3:2006 ASP=$1,097 74K units
Q2:2006 ASP=$1,162 84K units
Q1:2006 ASP=$1,191 94K units


The second comment that is making me lose sleep at night is the following:

“the projection market is fiercely competitive excluding a few notable segments has been commoditized. … We [InFocus] will be faster to market with new products and better price points.”

My interpretation of this statement is that instead of trying to use its industry relationships and intellectual property to move up-market, INFS is going to try to compete on price. Compete on price against giant Asian manufacturers (Sony, Sharp, Panasonic, etc) with unlimited financial resources, diversified streams of revenue which means they can lose money on projectors for a few years, and cheaper labor pool.

When I look at INFS I see a company that can’t raise ASPs even with brand new products and a company that has decided to pick a fight it has a very small chance of winning. This is why I am not bullish on the long term prospects for my INFS shares.

So why am I still holding on to my position and buying more?

Despite the long term problems, I feel that INFS is trading at least 50% below liquidation value. And that’s just to good of a deal to pass up.

I am not particularly bullish on Las Vegas real estate but if someone offered to sell me a house in Vegas for half of what the cabinets, shingles and tiles inside were worth if sold separately I would jump on that opportunity.


* DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Feb 14, 2008

INFS -- Operating Income Turns Positive

Last time I posted on INFS I was pretty critical of the new CEO and stated that I am “seriously rethink[ing] my investment …. and I am considering cutting my losses.”

I still stand by my statements and more I think about the long term prospects for INFS the more I want to push the SELL button. However, the current undervaluation seems so egregious that I am willing to overlook the crumby business and less than inspiring CEO and hold on to my shares.

INFS reported fourth quarter earnings last week and posted an operating profit for the first time since anyone alive can remember. Excluding the $3.7M charge for lease losses on vacated facilities, INFS posted Operating Income of $1.1M or $0.09 per share in the company’s seasonally biggest quarter. Since I did not cover the 3rd quarter, I will cover both at the same time.

The financials broke down as follows:

Q3:2007 results
Revenue $76M -- down 7% YoY
GProfit 13.8
GMargin 18.2% -- vs. 16.3% in Q2, 10.9% in Q1, 12.7% in Q3:06
EBT $(3.56)
D&A 1.0 -- estimated number since no CF statement yet
EBITDA $(2.56)


Q4:2007 results
Revenue $81M -- down 3% YoY
GProfit 16.5
GMargin 20.4%
EBT $1.1 -- excluded $3.7M lease write-off charge
D&A 1.0 -- estimated number since no CF statement yet
EBITDA $2.1


Q4:2007 ASP=$856 94K units shipped
Q3:2007 ASP=$882 85K units shipped
Q2:2007 ASP=$1,022 72K units shipped
Q1:2007 ASP=$853 91K units shipped
Q4:2006 ASP=$1,090 79K units shipped
Q3:2006 ASP=$1,097 74K units
Q2:2006 ASP=$1,162 84K units
Q1:2006 ASP=$1,191 94K units


Operating expenses excluding the lease charge were $15.4M, which was the target set previously by management. Based on comments made on the conference call, investors should not expect any further significant improvements in gross margins and operating expenses.

The balance sheet continues to be a thing of beauty with $84M in cash and zero debt or $2.11 per share in cash. In addition to the cash on hand, INFS still has over $200M in NOL’s.

In this post I calculated that if only half of the NOL’s can be used over the next 10 years they are worth roughly $1.50 per share today. So a stock trading at $1.70 has approximately $3.50 in cash on hand and NOL’s. The company also has an intellectual property portfolio that maybe worth something.

While I am not particularly bullish on the long term prospects for this company I believe that the stock is currently trading substantially below liquidation value. INFS represents 2.75% of the “Best Ideas” portfolio at a cost basis of $2.03 per share. I will be increasing the weighting to 4% of the portfolio.


* DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Nov 3, 2007

New CEO Appointed and INFS no longer on the selling block

As I have not posted in a while, I am going to catch up on major changes in the companies I analyzed for this blog and are in the Offthebeatenpathinvestments Best Ideas Marketocracy portfolio (and more importantly my own portfolio).

Looks like INFS appointed a new CEO and decided that the acquisition offers it received are not good enough. I am not particularly surprised that no deal went through and I wrote that I expect that much in one my original posts on INFS:

“ ….my feeling is that it would be hard for any CEO to justify buying a money losing operation even if he/she feels there is value to be added. Also, since Caxton is actively involved it’s highly likely that they would be looking for a very high premium – again, something most CEO’s could not justify to their boards, shareholders, or analysts.”


I don’t really have much more to add on this topic so will move on to the new CEO, Robert “Bob” O’Malley. Its amazing what a few hours and Google can turn up!

Here is an article talking about O’Malley’s departure from Tech Data. This article does not give me much confidence in the new CEO of INFS. It's full on “cover your ass” complements and ambiguities but short on any results attributed to O’Malley.

Phrases like this usually make me cringe: “O'Malley was an anchor” ……” He was driving a lot of the initiatives” …..WHAT THE HELL DOES THAT MEAN?

Here is O’Malley’s work history prior to INFS that I pieced together:

3/2005 – 9/2007, Tech Data -- VP of Marketing
10/2002 – 3/2005, UNKNOWN
10/2000 -- 10/2002, Immersion (IMMR) – CEO
6/1999 – 7/2000, Intermac (sub of UNA) -- President
1998 – 4/1999, MicroAge -- CEO of Pinacor
5/1995 -- 1998, MicroAge -- President of MicroAge Data Services
1/1976 – 5/1995, IBM -- Left as President of Desktop PC division


O'Malley's track record gives me even less hope than the praises of his Tech Data colleagues.

O’Malley was effectively fired from Pinacor in 1999 after being the CEO of that company for little over a year. He was actually moved to the Board of Directors but that’s what small companies do to CEO’s whom they want to fire to protect their public and industry reputation.

On his watch, Pinacor lost its biggest customer, Compaq, which accounted for 26% of sales at the time. It should be noted that Compaq fired a lot of distributors as it cut the number from 39 to 4. It should also be noted that Tech Data was a direct Pinacor competitor (they were one of the 4 that Compaq kept) and did end up hiring O’Malley which is somewhat of a sign of confidence. (http://www.crn.com/it-channel/159402582)

Still, Pinacor was one of the biggest in the business at the time and it’s the CEO’s job to protect key relationships.

O’Malley than turned up as President of Intermac and resigned 1 year later to move to Immersion. He lasted 1 year at Immersion. I was not able to find any more info on his employment between Immersion and Tech Data.

As I see it, this guy fashions himself as a CEO but was only able to last at management jobs at IBM and TechData – two behemoths where underperformers can slip through the cracks for years. His did not last more than two years at 3 small technology firms that he was given to run.

From his track record, there is not one shred of evidence that this guy can manage -- much less turnaround -- a small, money losing company that faces an onslaught of competition. Running INFS is a completely different challenge than a cushy marketing job at Tech Data or a management job at the mother ship, IBM.

I can’t believe this guy was actually compared to Michael Dell at one point.

This appointment basically says that either 1) Caxton did not do as much research on O’Malley as I did (which I seriously doubt) or 2) INFS is in so much trouble that O’Malley is the only guy they can find to run the company.

Either case is not an attractive proposition for INFS shareholders.

This appointment is making me seriously rethink my investment in INFS and I am considering cutting my losses.




* DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Jul 3, 2007

INFS -- “Final Thoughts”

In the previous 5 posts I talked at length about the problems faced by INFS as well as the attractive aspects of an investment in the company.

INFS continues to see prices for its products drop by double digit rates due to roughly 30-40 competing projector manufacturers as well as the ascent of LCD/Plasma televisions.

However, INFS is now controlled by a hedge fund which is the firm’s largest shareholder and will be picking the new management team and setting the new policies, the company has a fortress balance sheet, and it appears that the stock is trading at a discount to the combination of tangible liquidation value + non-tangible assets that certainly posses value for an acquirer.

If there is value for the shareholder, why didn’t anyone purchase INFS when it effectively put itself up for sale a few months ago?

I don’t have a definitive answer to this question but my feeling is that it would be hard for any CEO to justify buying a money losing operation even if he/she feels there is value to be added. Also, since Caxton is actively involved it’s highly likely that they would be looking for a very high premium – again, something most CEO’s could not justify to their boards, shareholders, or analysts.

There will be more key data points coming from the company within the next 6 months. The biggest in my opinion will be hiring of the new CEO and CFO by Caxton and the plan that will be outlined to other shareholders to turn the company around. There will also be a new proxy filled and it will be key to see how the two top people at the firm will be incentivised. Will their biggest gains come only if shareholders benefit (mostly long term restricted stock based compensation plan) or will they be awarded with mostly cash salaries and large parachutes?

Another two key data points in the next few quarters will be the trend in Gross Margins and G&A expense. Obviously these are key metrics for any company any time, but in the case of INFS the trends in Gross Margins and G&A expense will make the difference between survival and bankruptcy.

On the last quarterly call the recently departed CFO stated that gross margins took a 360bps SEQUENTIAL hit due to the company clearing out inventory of IN72 projectors and selling a lot more of the lower price point IN24 and IN26 projectors causing sequential volumes to go up 15% while revenue was down 7%. The CFO stated that they “aggressively sold these products” which of course in the real world means: “CRAZY EDDIE HERE, AND EVERYTHING MUST GO. SALE, SALE, SALE!!!!!!!” While aggressive discounting of course kills margins, the positive is that it clears the deck of old products and turns inventory into cash which the company needs right now. While not as clearly, that much was stated by management on the last call.

The company also needs to cut G&A expense immediately. While there is always a degree of uncertainty around new product introductions which management has no control over, expenses are completely under management’s control. The company needs to cut expenses and needs to do it immediately – this is where a new CEO/CFO team can make an immediate impact. Again, on the last conference call guidance was for $14.5M - $15.5M in quarterly G&A as the goal by year end from the current level of $19.2M in Q1:2007. It will be up to new management to cut expenses without cutting R&D. Cutting costs is great, but where to cut with manufacturing and call centers already outsourced?

One place where I think some cuts can be made is in the development/support of the dealer network as well as some general “home office” jobs. As I understand the business model, the company spends a lot of time training and supporting dealers that sell their product. This is a key function of course, but there maybe room to trim the least profitable dealers (which will mean giving up sales) and the people employed to support them (more profits from fewer dealers). This is by no means a given and in my experience the odds are against any new management team faced with this task.

So is INFS going to be added to the Watch List or the Best Ideas portfolio?

Based on my previous post, I think INFS is trading at a substantial discount to what an acquirer would be willing to pay for the company. The company is now run by the largest shareholders and it the company has the balance sheet needed for such a massive turnaround. Therefore I have added a 1% position in INFS to the Best Ideas portfolio. You will recall that my target for this portfolio is to have 10 full positions at roughly 8% each and 10 smaller positions that will hopefully be increased to full positions eventually.

What will I be watching for in the next few quarters?

I will be looking for a sequential bounce in Gross Margins as the company has apparently moved out the old discounted inventory and should see an increase as it starts selling more higher priced products. I don’t think the company is close to hitting the long term targeted GM of 16% to 18%, but not seeing an immediate increase would be a very bad sign.

After new management is hired I will be looking for declining G&A – are they heading towards previously guided $14.5M to $15.5M? What is management doing to cut expenses immediately?

Details of new CEO’s and CFO’s long term compensation – is it long term stock based or mostly cash?

I will also be looking for trends in revenue and average prices in Q3 and especially Q4. The projector industry is seasonal with most of the sales done in Q3 and Q4, with Q4 being by far the most important. Right now the stated plan is to migrate customers to higher margin IN24+ and IN26+ as well as new product launches like the IN10 ultra mobile projector. If after clearing out inventory the company can’t increase Gross Margins and show at least some initial increase in sales, there is no reason to own this stock.



* DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Jun 27, 2007

INFS -- “Da Bulls” Part III

The first two bullish posts talked about shareholders controlling the firms destiny and INFS having the balance sheet required for a turnaround. This post will concentrate on valuation.

Since we are in the early innings of the “turnaround” and its impossible (at least for me) to estimate future cash flow, the only relevant way to value this company is by trying to calculate an acquisition value.

Lets see what this pig is worth ……fist lets look at the tangible liquidation value

Cash & Equivalents ……. $78M
Net Receivables …… $35M (reported $47M, discount by 25%)
Inventory …… $18M (reported $36M, discounted by 50%)
Other CA $9M

Current Liabilities……. ($83M)
Other LT Liab ……. ($4M)
Tangible Liquidation Value …$53M or $1.33M per share

Value of Motif* ……. $23M (50% share of 15x 2006 net income of $3.1)
Non-Cancelable Leases….. ($17M)
Revenue from Sub-Leasing** …$8.5M
Intangible Liquidation Value …..$10.2M (total intangible value $14.5M discounted by 30%)

Total Liquidation Value $63.2M or $1.60/sh
Current Market Value $97M or $2.44/sh

*Motif is a 50/50 JV with Motorola. Net income in 2006, 2005, 2004 has been $3.1M, $7.3M, $4.7M respectively (note 12 in 2006 10K).

**INFS currently sub-leases some the properties it liquidated as part of the restructuring. To be conservative, I assumed they could sub-lease their current properties at 50% of what they are paying.


What is not included in this liquidation value but is worth something to an acquirer?

1) by far the biggest thing that is missing from $1.60 liquidation value I calculated above is the over $200M in NOL’s that INFS is currently carrying. The problem is that you can’t just discount the $200M and add it to value of the company because the nature of tax laws give different acquires different abilities to use the NOL’s. On the last conference call, the CFO (who is no longer with the company) said that much. However, he also said that to the right buyer the NOL’s have real dollar value.

How much could they be worth? Well, lest say the acquirer can only use 50% of the NOL’s over the next 10 years. Discounted at 6%, the PV is $56M or $1.41/share.

2) another exclusion from the above liquidation value is INFS “intellectual property” (patents, R&D department, brand name, etc.) and its reseller network. While its hard for me to assign a specific dollar value to the company’s intellectual property I think it has a value of more than zero. Despite its problems, INFS still has patents and the know how to make high quality projectors and I feel that this technology is worth something to a potential acquirer. They also have years of relationships with resellers and do posses shelf space that has a tangible dollar value to an acquirer.

I am not going to spend a lot of time talking about the “brand name” even though they state (very often) that they have the largest installed base of projectors and leading brand name. I think its pointless to talk about your “brand name” when you have seen ASP’s fall by double digit rates over the last 4 years– obviously your brand name is not very strong.

So what does this all mean?

Well, I think at the current market price of $2.44 per INFS share you are getting $1.60 of tangible liquidation value as wells as $200M+ of NOLs and the company’s intellectual property which I think is worth over $1.50 per share – even if the acquirer can only use half of the NOL’s they are worth $1.40/share by my calculations.

Obviously INFS is a very high risk investment in the early stages of a shareholder led transformation, but at current prices you are paying a discount to acquisition value.


The next post will conclude my analysis of INFS.


*
DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Jun 25, 2007

INFS -- “Da Bulls” Part II

The other bullish aspects of an investment in INFS is that the despite the horrible financial performance the company still has a great balance sheet and the valuation seems to be attractive.

Lets looks at the easy part first …..

INFS has $78M in cash on hand based on the latest quarterly results (Q1:2007), no long-term bank debt, and $4M in “other long term debt”. This translates to $74M ($1.86/sh) in free cash that can be used to cover negative cash flow and reinvestment into the business.

Based on 2006 FCF Statement, INFS had negative operating cash flow of $15M and capex of $5.3M for a total cash burn of $20M. Assuming no improvement in operations, INFS has enough cash to remain solvent for over 3 years. Why is this important?

Well …. Having the financial wherewithal to stay solvent until those activist shareholders and/or new management team can work their magic is another must that I look for when investing in turnarounds. The cash hoard and no interest payments gives INFS management some breathing room as they work on turning the company around and gives them the cash to make investments in R&D and/or Capex to effect the turnaround.

Ok, so the board has the same interest as the shareholders and the company is not going to go bankrupt anytime soon. But, does the current valuation provide enough margin of safety to compensate for the huge amount of risk that is involved in investing in a company that is bleeding cash and does not seem to have any apparent “moat” around its business? Or is this a coin toss?

I originally planned on including the valuation in this post, but it is getting long. The third bullish post will go over my calculation of liquidation value for INFS.

Jun 22, 2007

INFS -- “Da Bulls” Part I

The one sentence bullish case for INFS is that the company’s largest shareholder now controls the board of directors and will be handpicking the new management team, the company has the balance sheet needed to turn itself around, and the stock is currently trading at a discount to acquisition value.

As I mentioned in my initial post on INFS, one of the reasons that I am looking at this stock is because Caxton is now the largest shareholder of the company with 11.2% of the shares outstanding and they control the board. Stated another way, going forward the shareholder with the most money at stake will be running the show.

If you read my posts on CPY, you know that I consider such direct aligning of interests between shareholders and the people running the company (board of directors and management as their agents) as a must for profitable turnaround investments. Because of this, I consider piggy-backing onto large institutional investors who are planning to act as activists to facilitate the turnaround as a very attractive strategy.

If you read the original letter written by Caxton when they reported their holding but before they were given their first 2 board seats , their discontent with INFS is pretty generic:

  1. board has no vision
  2. board has no significant shareholders
  3. must have a new business plan that assures profitability or sell the company

So far, Caxton has been able to fix one of the three points. As part of their agreement with the company to call of a proxy fight, Caxton got to name 2 directors in April if INFS was not sold. With the April and June appointments, Caxton has control of the board and there is now representation on the board from a significant shareholder.

Off the four Caxton board members, two have industry experience and the other two are from the financial sector. Robert Ladd was one of the two directors appointed on June 6th, Ladd runs Laddcap Value Associates which owns 0.6% of INFS shares.

Interestingly, the other director from the financial sector is John Abouchar who according to this article covered INFS as a sell side analyst and was critical of the company. You don’t often get to see sell side guys getting to make changes in the company’s they cover

Its unclear at this point what Caxton will do to regarding the other two points raised in their letter, 1) vision, and 3) new business plan.

According to the previously linked article, Caxton has called for INFS to turn itself into a an intellectual property company as opposed to a manufacturer, call center provider, parts manufacturer, etc. I have only listened to the latest few conference call and the only thing I have ever heard the Caxton guy say is that he is upset about the company performance and as the largest shareholder they are pissed-off. Naturally!

I think the intellectual property route is an attractive one for INFS. This company will never be able to compete with the big boys (Sony, etc.) or the low cost generic manufacturers so spending less time and money on the non-research related business functions would free up time and resources to spend on being a technology innovator. The company has already outsourced all its manufacturing but there are still a lot of non-R&D functions done by the company that I think Caxton and the new CEO will be looking to cut.

As I said in the beginning of the post, I consider having a large shareholder on the board of directors as a must before investing in a turnaround situation.


*
DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Jun 21, 2007

INFS -- “Da Bears” Part II

The second major bearish case for INFS is that this company may never again earn a sufficient rate of return for shareholders. The company has been in a perpetual state of restructuring for the last five years with no sustained improvement achieved. For example, in the last 16 quarters the company has recorded 13 negative “one time charges” and this does not include inventory write-offs which are dumped into cost of goods—needless to say that at this point these are no longer one time in nature.

Here is a brief history of restructuring expenses:
2003
$15.7M inventory write-down (COGS)
$6.7M “restructuring charge” -- lease breakage, severance costs, etc.
$26.4M long lived asset impairment charge

2004
Negligible

2005
$27M inventory write-down (COGS)
$11.1M “restructuring charge”
$9.8M long lived asset impairment charge
$5.1M in SMT related losses

2006
$8.4M inventory write-down (COGS)
$5.4M “restructuring charge”
$9.4M regulatory assessment charge due to China customs case
$7M in SMT write-downs and TUN write-off

INFS also took a $7.4M charge in 2006 to write-down value for investments in technology companies that did not work out.

Looking at this restructuring history leads me to think about the following maxim: “turnarounds seldom ever turn.”

Over the last few years management has made other notable mistakes, specifically the failed and unnecessary JV to incubate a 3rd party manufacturer and the export problems with China. I am not going to spend any more time on these as 1) you can read about them in the latest 10K and I can’t add much more insight than that, 2) the management team that was responsible for these mistakes is no longer with INFS, 3) while these missteps have cost shareholders real money, I don’t think these missteps provide any indication about INFS’s core problems and really are one time in nature.

As I see it, the two main reasons not to own shares of INFS is that the company may never earn above average rate of return for an extended period of time due to
1) consumer and business electronics is a cut-throat industry with very little room for any managerial mistakes, and
2) the fact that INFS has been constantly restructuring without any consistent positive results maybe a sign that there is something inherently wrong with the business model that no amount of investment or managerial talent can fix


* DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Jun 20, 2007

INFS -- “Da Bears” Part I

Since there is a lot more bad than good to talk about with INFS, I will jump right into the bearish case. The one sentences bearish case for INFS is that the company was grossly mismanaged just as the projector industry experienced a severe inventory glut and competition from LCD/Plasma televisions.

The mismanagement at INFS over the last few years has come in several flavors …..

First, the company’s management simply failed to properly position their business for the continued price compression in the projector industry. You could make the argument that there is not way management could foretell this, even though its part of their job description. Fine ……

The real mistake that INFS made is that it significantly invested in inventory at the worst possible time. Inventory on hand increased from $62M at the end of 2003 to $155M at the end of 2004. Of the $93M increase, $73M came in the form of “finished goods” (see Note #3 of 2004 10K) which is basically finished projectors sitting in the company’s warehouse, collecting dust and depreciating every single day.

Just as the company significantly invested in inventory, ASP (average sales price) continued their sharp declines …. (all data is from the 10K’s)

2006 (vs. 20005)……-15.5%
2005 ……..-17%
2004………-20%
2003………-27%

This has cost the company dearly in the form of severe gross margin compression as INFS had to lower prices and simply write-off a big chunk of inventory in 2005. Gross Margins fell to 8% in 2005 (this includes the $27M inventory write-off) and 15% in 2006.

On its own terms this is bad enough, however this becomes even a bigger problem when you consider the fact that INFS operates in a highly competitive industry and really cannot afford such missteps. Unfortunately, business and consumer electronics is not an industry where dumb management will be overcome by superior industry dynamics.

INFS is facing severe price pressures from Asian electronics companies that can produce projectors cheaper, have diversified product lines so they can withstand some margin compression on projectors, and have superior financial position to withstand an industry shake out.

Also driving ASPs lower is the emergence of LCD and Plasma televisions as a real competitor. I called one and visited another high end home entertainment provider and my sense is that projectors (both home entertainment and fixed business use projectors) still provide a bigger and better picture per dollar spent compared to LCD or Plasma televisions in similar price range. However, LCD and Plasma TVs are simply a hot product right now and provide a good enough picture which means they are stealing sales and projector manufacturers must lower prices to compete with these often cheaper alternatives (as well as other projector manufacturers).

I will continue with other bearish aspects in the next post ……


* DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.

Jun 13, 2007

INFS -- First Look

Initially attracted to the stock for the following reasons
-James Altucher posted on his Daily Blog Watch that Caxton Associates announced that they have accumulated an 8.9% position in the stock and will be acting as an activist shareholder
-$1.96 per share in unrestricted cash & equivalents and no debt, stock price at $2.60
-operating CF as reported on FCF Statement substantially higher than reported GAAP EBITDA and Net Income
-great products, awful financial performance

Currently
Share Price: $2.44
Market Value: $97M
Enterprise Value: $23M
Investment Type: Turnaround Situation

InFocus Corp. (INFS) is a developer of projectors used for business, education, and home entertainment. The company has a spectrum of products retailing from $500 to over $10,000. In the latest annual report the company uses such words as “industry pioneer,” “worldwide leader,” and “premium.” The company also states that they have the largest installed base of projectors compared to anyone in the industry. While all of these statements might be true I have a hard time assigning such praise to a company that has not reported twelve months worth of positive EBITDA since the third quarter of 2002.

INFS was a high flying tech stock in the “good old days” with peak revenue of $887 million in 2000 and EBITA of $97M in that year. Share price in early October 2000 hit an all time high of $56 per share giving the company a market value of $2.3 billion. The big boost to sales in 1999 (sales up 125%) and 2000 (sales up 29% YoY) came from the growth of “ultraportable” and “microportable” projectors that were above 1,000 lumens and could be carried around and attached to laptops. The first ultraportable projectors were introduced in Q1-1999 and by 2000 accounted for almost 80% of sales.

Don’t know what a “lumen” is? Basically, higher lumen count = brither colors http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lumen_(unit)

Oh how the mighty have fallen …..

In the latest fiscal year ended December 2006, the company reported revenue of $375M and EBITDA of negative $29M.

While it’s not hard to understand why revenue fell by a third between 2000 and 2003—business spending dried up and even the best tech firms experienced similar problems—it is imperative to understand why revenue has not recovered with the economy.

In the last six months there has been substantial developments with the company. Caxton has raised their stake to almost 12% of oustanding share. In February 2007, the company allowed Caxton to nominate 2 directors to the board in order to prevent a proxy fight. INFS unsuccessfully put itself up for sale. The CEO retired in May. And on June 6th, Caxton appointed 2 more directors to the board giving it effective control of the company and the ability to hand pick the new CEO.

As always, I will continue with my analysis by laying out a bullish and bearish case and make a final decision on whether to add this stock to the Watch List Portfolio or the Best Ideas Portfolio.

* DISCLOSURE: I or accounts I manage may be long or short any and/or all stocks mentioned in this post. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For informational and educational purposes only.